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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF RULE lOb-5
Ian D. A. Webb
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 as implemented by rules and
regulations2 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and as
interpreted by the courts, was enacted to provide protection for the
American investor against abusive securities practices. In recent years,
a great deal of litigation has arisen under rule lOb-5,3 which provides
relief for fraud in the "purchase or sale" of securities.4 As a result of such
actions, rule 1 Ob-5 has given rise to a body of federal law which provides
the SEC and private investors with an arsenal of weapons against fraudu-
lent practices by securities dealers and corporate management. 5 To de-
cide whether these weapons can and should be directed toward activities
outside the United States requires a twofold examination of the extra-
territorial reach of such legislation: first, whether extraterritorial appli-
1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78hh (1964).
2. See, e.g., id. §10 (b), 15 U.S.C. §78j (b) (1964) and §30 (b), 15 U.S.C. §78dd (b)
(1964) (Congressional authorization to the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations.
3. Rule X-10B-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1968) (known as the "anti-fraud rule">
which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facilities of
any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the SEC to implement section 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§78j (b) (1964) (manipulative or deceptive devices in contravention of the SEC rules
and regulations).
The federal courts have implied a civil right of action under rule lob-5. See Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613
(E.D. Pa. 1947); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1966); see also
Dystra, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5, UTAH L. REv. 207 (1967).
4. An actual "purchase or sale" is no longer required. See Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Nat'l Securities Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (a misleading proxy state-
ment in the merger of two insurance companies held to involve a "purchase" of
securities under rule lOb-5) ; Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F. 2d 24 (2d Cir.
1964) (the issuance by a corporation of its own shares held, in a derivative action, to
be a "sale" under rule lOb-5).
5. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F. 2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc>, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Many former shareholders
also sued the company for their losses in prematurely selling their securities.
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cation would violate international law; second, the effect of statutory
interpretation regulating the conduct of foreigners in securities trans-
actions.
I. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHICH LIMIT
LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Any statute which may have effects outside the United States will
generally be construed with deference to established principles
of international law.8 A brief examination of the principles upon which
legislative jurisdiction has been based in criminal and civil actions indi-
cates the present limitations upon the effect of the Securities Acts.7 The
relevant accepted bases of legislative jurisdiction in international law are
enumerated following.
A. TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLES.
A state may legislate to control conduct within its boundaries, even
if the effects of such conduct are felt only outside the country.8 This
"territorial principle" has gradually been expanded to produce valid
jurisdiction in the reverse situation. International law now considers a
state to have:
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs
outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either (a) the
conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime
or tort .. .or (b) ... the effect within the territory is substantial .. . as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct.... .9
This extension, termed the "objective territorial principle," provides
little guidance for the courts in their attempts to delineate legislative
jurisdiction. The basic problem raised by such a principle stems from
judicial difficulty in interpreting the meaning of "substantial effects."' 0
6. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
("[W]e are not to read general words, such as those in this [Sherman] Act, without
regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their
powers .. ")
7. See generally H. STEINER AND D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 799-801
(1968).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §17
(1965). (Hereinafter cited as "RESTATEMENT. ' )
9. Id. §18 (1965); See also Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. Before deciding the question of substantial effects, the courts are usually faced
with the problem of whether due process requirements prohibit the acquisition of
personal jurisdiction when there has been extraterritorial service of process. In Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission v. Briggs, 234 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ohio 1964), the
Commission sought an injunction for violation of the fraud and registration provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Defendant
argued that service of process in Vancouver, Canada by mail and by a Deputy Sheriff
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Consequently, the courts have not sufficiently clarified this issue of how
substantial an effect on domestic commerce must be in order to give
legislative jurisdiction in the field of economic regulation. This obscurity
arises because in the eyes of the domestic courts things which could be
said to affect commerce of the United States by definition have a "sub-
stantial effect."". Such an assumption, however, may be too easily made
since it is not clear under international legal standards what effects
are indeed "substantial."' 2 Furthermore, with the recent increase of
foreign multinational enterprises owned by United States citizens,' 3 the
courts are likely to find that a relatively small effect on domestic markets
would be enough to attach legal consequences to extraterritorial conduct.
The basic "objective territorial principle," as utilized by the courts, is
effectively exemplified by the Case of the S. S. Lotus.'4 The French
steamer Lotus and the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt collided on the high
seas, the latter ship sinking with loss of life. The Lotus continued on
of British Columbia violated the due process requirements of the United States Con-
stitution. The district court found that since the defendant was a United States citizen
and had been involved in transactions in Ohio, these "contacts" were sufficient to
satisfy due process.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. V.T.R. Inc., 39 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
involved sales by a German bank of unregistered stock by its New York agent on the
American Stock Exchange. Process was served on the defendant-bank in Germany. The
court stated that "defendant's activity within the forum in the selling of unregistered
stock was substantial" and found there was personal jurisdicion especially since "there
clearly was business transacted by the defendants in this state." Id. at 22-23.
In Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), defendant objected to
service of process on an officer of the corporation in Ontario as invalid. The court,
in deciding whether due process prevented acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant
without the United States, stated that since "Denison controlled a United States
corporation whose executive offices are in this district ... there cannot be any doubt
that the minimum contacts which are necessary for due process purposes exist, especial-
ly where the present case arises from that control .. "
Briggs, V.T.R. and Ferraioli, in effect, based their findings of personal jurisdiction
on a "substantial contacts" test, that is, a substantial act or connection within the ter-
ritorial limits of the United States.
11. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 200, rev'd on rehearing on other
grounds, 405 F. 2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 406 (1969):
A fraud upon a corporation which has the effect of depriving it of fair compensa-
tion for the issuance of its stock would necessarily have the effect of reducing the
equity of the corporation's shareholders and this reduction in equity would be re-
flected in lower prices bid for the shares on the domestic stock market. This impair-
ment of the value of American investments by sales by the issuer in a foreign
country, allegedly in violation of the Act, has in our view, a sufficiently serious
effect upon United States commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction for the
protection of American investors and consideration of the merits of plaintiff's claim.
Id. at 209-210. (Emphasis added).
12. A domestic court could easily justify the extraterritorial reach of securities laws
in the light of such a broad legal standard.
13. See generally Vagts, Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge For Transna-
tional Law, 83 HA{v. L. Ray. 739 (1970).
14. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
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to Constantinople where the French officer of the watch was arrested,
tried and convicted of manslaughter under the Turkish Penal Code. The
Permanent Court of International Justice concluded that the extension
of legislative jurisdiction over conduct outside the territory of a state is
permissable unless it violates a principle of international law.' 5 In dicta,
the Court implied that international law does impose limits on the extra-
territorial assertion of jurisdiction. If jurisdiction is to be based on the
fact that "one of the constituent elements of the offense, and more
especially its effects,"' 6 have taken place within the state asserting juris-
diction, then such effects must be "legally and entirely inseparable" from
the conduct outside the territory, "so much so that their separation ren-
ders the offence nonexistent."l 7 This formulation of the "objective ter-
ritorial principle" by the Court in Lotus would appear to require more
than a minimal effect within the United States in order to support legis-
lative jurisdiction. Moreover, section 18 of the Restatement requiring a
"substantial effect" within the territorial boundaries is a similar formula-
tion to that of the Lotus "objective territorial principle." The problem
raised by this principle as stated by section 18 and Lotus is that the courts
are tempted to use a "substantial contacts" test which has dubious value
with regard to answering the question of legislative jurisdiction under
the territoriality principles.' 8 It would be helpful to the courts if Con-
gress or preferably the SEC provided some guidelines delineating the ap-
plicability of legislation when dealing with complex economic regulations
which regulate the conduct of citizens in other countries. An agency such
as the SEC is in a position where it could make extensive studies and sug-
gest policy alternatives so that both American and foreign interests would
be accommodated. 19
15. The court also held that the Turkish vessel could be considered as Turkish
territory. However, this holding was reversed by article 11 (1) of the Convention on
the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.IA.S. No. 5200. (If ships collide on
the high seas, and a person is responsible, such person cannot be subjected to penal
measures except by the flag state or state of which the person is a national.)
16. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 23.
17. Id. at 30.
18. In Ferraoli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), a rule lob-5 action was
brought against a Canadian corporation. Even though the negotiations and "sale"
had taken place in Canada, the court stressed that the
alleged violation is a transfer of control at a premium without disclosing the
premium offered and without obtaining equal opportunity for other shareholders;
that is the course of conduct which is alleged to violate rule lOb-5. Id. at 846.
The court found that an integral part of the challenged transaction, that is, the
transfer of control, took place within the United States and therefore rule lOb-5 was
applicable. Rather than determine if the "sale" had "substantial effects" within the
United States, the court was more interested in finding a "substantial contact" or act
within the United States.
19. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69
COLUM. L. Rv. 94, 111 (1969; But see Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the Foreign
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As can be observed from the above construction of the territorial prin-
ciples, international law does not limit the application of legislation such
as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to the territorial boundaries of
the United States. Fraudulent conduct relating to securities transactions
in a foreign country, such as Canada, could generally be considered to
have a "substantial effect" on American investors and a detrimental effect
upon the investor's confidence in the government's power to police the
markets. Therefore, regulation of this conduct would be considered with-
in the limitations as set by the "objective territorial principle."
B. NATiONALITY
Nationality is another recognized basis for the application of domestic
law outside of territorial boundaries. "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe
a rule of law ... attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of
the state wherever the conduct occurs .... -20 Although this is well set-
tled, problems often arise involving the determination of the nationality
of the parties involved. It is not usually difficult to determine the na-
tionality of a natural person and this note is not concerned with the
problem. Difficulties are more often found when a corporation is in-
volved. Although most countries generally attribute to a corporation the
nationality of the state where it was organized,21 in the cases and statutes,
varying combinations of additional factors have been considered deter-
minative:2 the principal place of business, the nationality of the share-
holders, the overall investment, the management, and control. A recent
trend in domestic law has been to abandon the rigid place of incorpora-
tion formula and adopt a more realistic approach of appraising corpor-
ate affiliations with different jurisdictions. 23 In particular, international
Issuer Exemption: A study in the Process of Accommodating Foreign Interests, 54
CORNELL L. Rv. 358 (1969).
20. RESTATEMENT §30 (1965); see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US. 571, 587 (1953) ("A
state 'is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of
its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of
other nations or their nationals are not infringed.'") ; Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 436 (1932) ('By virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States
retained its authority over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him
in a foreign country.")
21. RESTATEAMENT §27 (1965)..
22. See Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints on
Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1530-50 (1961) ; Comment, The Nationality
of International Corporations under Civil Law and Treaty, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1429
(1961).
23. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 172 (1968); See
also RE rATEMENT, Reporter's Note No. 3 at 519: "[T]here may be situations where a
corporation, organized under the law of one state is also a national of another state,
under the latter's law, by reason of local activities .. " See, eg., 28 U.S.C. §1332 (c) :
[A] corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been in-
corporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business....
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agreements and codifications have given more consideration to the in-
jured shareholder, and to his nationality. For example, the United
States will allow an action on behalf of American shareholders in a
foreign corporation if they come under section 172 of the Restatement.2 4
A number of bilateral agreements settling expropriation claims are an
example of such practice.2 5
Doubt might have been cast upon the force of this trend minimizing
the importance of the place of incorporation formula by the recent
decision in the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company20 case. The
Belgian government had claimed a right to represent in a Spanish litiga-
tion certain Belgian nationals who owned the controlling interest in the
Barcelona Traction Company, a holding company with extensive invest-
ments in Spain. The company and its subsidiaries were incorporated in
Canada. Belgium asserted that after Barcelona Traction was declared
bankrupt in Spain, the subsequent cancelling of shares located outside
Spain and the sale of new shares of the Spanish subsidiary companies
caused direct and immediate injury to the rights and interests of the
Belgian shareholders. The World Court held that the Belgian govern-
ment did not have the right to assert diplomatic claims on behalf of the
corporation or its shareholders. In establishing the nationality of the
company, the Court looked only to the place of incorporation.
24. RwTATEMENT §172 (1965):
When a domestic corporation, in which an alien is directly or indirectly a share-
holder, is injured by action attributable to a state that would be wrongful under
international law if the corporation were an alien corporation, the state is not
responsible under international law for the injury to the corporation. The state is,
however, responsible for the consequent injury to the alien to the extent of his in-
terest in the corporation, if
(a) a significant portion of the stock of the corporation is owned by the alien or
other aliens of whatever nationality,
(b) the state knows or has reason to know of such ownership at the time of the
conduct causing the injury to the corporation,
(c) the corporation fails to obtain reparation for the injury,
(d) such failure is due to causes over which the alien or other alien shareholders
cannot exercise control, and
(e) a claim for the injury to the corporation has not been voluntarily waived
or settled by the corporation.
Stock ownership is "significant" if it is 25% or greater. Id., Reporter's Note No. 2, at
524.
25. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg,
February 23, 1962, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce with Pakistan, Nov. 12, 1959, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683.
See generally Bagge, Intervention on the Ground of Damage Caused to Nationals,
with Particular Reference to Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the Rights of Share-
holders, 34 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 162 (1958).
26. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited
(Belgium v. Spain) [1970] I.C.J. - , 9 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 227
(1970).
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It is difficult to make a realistic assessment of how American courts are
likely to react to Barcelona Traction. The issue in that case involved the
right of a country to make a diplomatic claim, the Court deciding Canada
had this exclusive right. That domestic courts will use this to rule in
favor of a strict place of incorporation test in all cases seems somewhat
doubtful. The courts of the United States are likely to continue to
determine the nationality of a corporation by looking to the nationality,
domicile or residence of the controlling individuals (aggregate test) or
by looking to the place of incorporation, place of board meetings or place
of business (entity test).27 Such methods would not appear to conflict
with the nationality principle of Barcelona Traction if that case is read
narrowly by the court on its facts. Furthermore, such a reading would
not seem to hinder the United States from exerting control through its
securities laws over corporations incorporated abroad but controlled by
American shareholders or a board of directors located in the United
States. A corporation in this latter position could probably be con-
sidered a national of the United States under the aggregate test.28 Situa-
tions may arise in which attempted control of the conduct of foreign
corporations substantially connected with the United States could prove
to be fruitless2 9 In many such cases, control might better be effectuated
through control of United States nationals involved with these corpora-
tions.
C. PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE
Under this recently accepted principle of legislative jurisdiction, a
state may prescribe a rule of criminal law "attaching legal consequences
to the conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state"
or has an adverse effect upon its "governmental functions." 30 Even though
this principle has been seldom used, its significance lies in its breadth
due to the varied possibilities for jurisdiction which it raises. Such broad
notions could potentially be used to allow a state to prescribe a rule of
law applicable to conduct outside its territory which only has a slight
effect within, if the conduct obstructs government "functions." If the
maintenance of confidence in securities exchanges and the corporate
27. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES, 128 (1970).
28. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §300.329 (1968) (giving jurisdiction to the United States over
corporations outside the United States if owned or controlled by United States' citizens).
29. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19(1963) (an "ad hoc weighing of contacts basis . . .would inevitably lead to embar-
rassment in foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in actual practice.").
30. RESrATEMENT §33 (1965). The Restatement uses as illustrations of this principle
the counterfeiting of currency and false statements made to diplomatic officials. Id.
§39 (2).
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financing mechanism were considered to be government functions, it is
conceivable that this principle would provide a basis for legislating extra-
territorially. In a lOb-5 action, however, a court would probably prefer
to use one of the territorial bases, those principles being more widely
recognized.
Under these accepted bases of jurisdiction for prescribing rules of
law, United States legislation such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
can be applied to certain conduct occurring without the United States.
Nevertheless, it is not clear what limits are imposed on the extraterri-
torial application of the Act under the "objective territorial principle"
test of "substantial effects". For clarification, it is necessary to consider
domestic decisions which purport to clarify the intent embodied in the
Securities Exchange Act, and the exemption which the terms of that Act
extend to some foreign activities.31
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934
In general, Congressional enactments are presumed to apply only
within the territorial limits of the United States unless a contrary intent
is dearly evidenced. 32 The concern of Congress, especially in the field
of economic regulation,33 is usually with domestic affairs. This pre-
sumption is borne out by the terms of section 30 (b) of the Exchange
Act, which provides:
The provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply
to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction
of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate to prevent the evasion of this title.3 4
The SEC has not to date promulgated any regulations pursuant to this
section.
A problem arises in determining the scope of this exemption in the
light of other provisions which do not seem to manifest an intent that
the Exchange Act should apply to certain transactions outside of the
United States. Section 2 of the Exchange Act states that because trans-
actions in securities are affected with "a national public interest," it is
31. 1934 Act §30(b), 15 U.S.C. §78dd(b) (1964).
32. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1937); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) ("All legislation is prima facie terri-
torial.") For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, see
Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 94, 97-99 (1969).
33. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949>.
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §30 (b), 15 U.S.C. §78dd (b) (1964) ; see Goldman
& Magrino, Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation
of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1969).
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"necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and
of matters related thereto ... and to insure the maintenance of fair and
honest markets in such transactions." 35 Although this statement might
give the courts some support for extending the investor protections of-
fered by the Act to foreign transactions, it is unclear whether Congress
intended such a result.3 6
Until recently, the courts were reluctant to extend securities legisla-
tion to foreign countries by reading such an intent into the statute.
For example, in Kook v. Crang,37 an American investor brought an action
for money damages against the partners of a Canadian brokerage firm
alleging a violation of the Federal Reserve margin rules promulgated by
the SEC under the authority conferred by section 7 (c) of the Securities
Exchange Act.38 The brokerage firm, after negotiations with the plaintiff
in its Toronto office, bought the stock of a Canadian Corporation on
margin on the Toronto exchange. This stock was traded solely on the
Canadian exchange, orders were placed and payment made in Canada,
and credit was extended and stock held as collateral in Canada. The
defendant partners had used the United States mail for negotiations,
were registered as broker-dealers under section 15 of the Exchange Act,30
and maintained an office in New York to deal solely with the New York
exchanges.
Plaintiff maintained that the registration under section 15 by itself
brought defendants within the prohibitions of section 7 (c) while de-
fendant argued that section 30 (b) exempted the transaction from the
coverage of the Securities Exchange Act since it took place "without the
jurisdiction of the United States." The court held on neither ground,
but stated that the transaction in Canada did not fall within section
7 (c) in the first place, since the statute required a connection between
the extension of credit and the "business transacted with a member" of
a national (American) securities exchange. 40 The extension of credit
was connected only with a member of a Canadian exchange.
The court did discuss section 30(b), which it felt specifically re-
stricted the Act to the transaction of business within the United States.
41
It was the opinion of the court that although Congress could have legis-
35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §2, 15 U.S.C. §78b (1964).
36. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 200, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds,
405 F. 2d 215 (2d cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
37. 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
38. Section 7 (c) forbids any broker or dealer "who transacts a business in securi-
ties through the medium of" a member of a national securities exchange to extend
credit except in accordance with the rules of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §7 (c), 15 U.S.C. §78g(c) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
39. 15 U.S.C. §780 (a) (1964).
40. Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
41. Id.
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lated extraterritorially, "jurisdiction" as used in the section 30 (b)
exemption meant the territorial limits of the United States. Thus, for
a transaction to be "within the jurisdiction of the United States," the
Statute required a "necessary and substantial act" 42 within the borders of
the United States. In effect the court concluded that all provisions of the
'34 Act, not explicitly extended extraterritorially by a rule or regulation
of the SEC, could only be applied to a transaction of which a "sub-
stantial," "necessary," and integral part was performed in the United
States. 43 Moreover, Kook shows that the Act must be more substantial
than activities merely coming within the Securities Acts jurisdictional
clauses, by means of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce.
In Ferraioli v. Cantor,44 the same general approach as was used in
Kook was followed. A shareholder of a New York corporation brought
an action under rule lOb-5 against a Canadian corporation which had
owned the controlling interest in the New York corporation, and had
transferred that interest at a premium in Canada without informing the
other shareholders or giving them an opportunity to obtain the favorable
price. On rehearing, the court reversed its earlier opinion,45 holding in
favor of the defendant. The decision was based to a large degree on
rationale similar to Kook, that the 30 (b) exemption applied to persons
involved in a single transaction outside of the jurisdiction.46 The court
also agreed that persons outside the jurisdiction could be subjected to the
liabilities of the Act only if they performed some substantial act within
the jurisdiction in connection with the allegedly wrongful transaction.4 7
The court seemed to employ a more liberal meaning of "substantial" than
that delineated by the court in Kook. Here application of the Act in
Ferraioli was based upon the transfer of control occurring in New York
where the corporation was located, in spite of the fact that the actual
sale took place in Canada. The court found that there was use of the
mails in connection with the transaction,48 and held, in contrast to
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
45. Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,615(S.D.N.Y. 1965> (mem.).
46. Id. at 95,311.
47. Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
48. In a rule lOb-5 action, for a federal court to have jurisdiction, instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, the mails, or facilities of a national securities exchange must
be used. Even though the substance of a rule lOb-5 violation is a fraudulent scheme
employed in the purchase or sale of securities, the use of the mails or other interstate
facilities is the jurisdictional base of a complaint or prosecution. See SEC v. Gulf
Intercont'l Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963). In other words, if it is
determined that the '34 Act is to apply to the allegedly fraudulent foreign activities,
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Kook, that this use of interstate commerce was an inseparable part of
the transfer of control, thus a substantial act had occurred within the
jurisdiction.49
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook o,5 0 plaintiff, an American shareholder in
Banff Oil, a Canadian corporation, brought a derivative suit against
Aquitaine Company of Canada Ltd. which owned a controlling interest
in Banff. The complaint alleged that the directors of the two corporations
had been guilty of nondisclosure to the shareholders of Banff in a sale
of a large quantity of Banff treasury stock to Aquitaine shortly before
the announcement of a Banff oil strike sent the value of its shares sharply
upwards. Banff carried out all of its business in Canada, although its
shares were registered on the American Stock Exchange.
In an opinion by Chief Judge Lumbard, the court held in favor of
the extraterritorial application of lOb-5 on broad policy grounds, reject-
ing the approaches of Kook and Ferraioli.
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial ap-
plication in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securi-
ties on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from
the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities. In our view,
neither the usual presumption against extraterritorial application of legislation
nor the specific language of Section 30(b) show Congressional intent to preclude
application of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the
United States when extraterritorial application of the Act is necessary to protect
American investors.51
the issue then to be determined is whether there is a use of the mails or interstate
commerce sufficient to meet the requirements of rule lOb-5. See Schoenbaum v. First-
brook, 405 F. 2d 200, 210, reted on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F. 2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). It has recently been recognized
that the use of the mails need not be central to the fraudulent scheme and may be
entirely incidental and indirect. See United States v. Cashin, 281 F. 2d 609, 673 (1960)
(mail was used to confirm purchases already induced by defendants deceit). This
notion is confirmed by the fact that all the SEC fraud provisions use the language
"directly or indirectly." So if a rule lOb-5 defendant caused another person to use
the mails, a court would have jurisdiction.
49. See also SEC v. Gulf Intercont'l Fin. Corp. 223 F. Supp. 987 (S. D. Fla. 1963)
where citizens of Florida, who controlled a number of Florida corporations, organized
a Canadian corporation in Canada and sold the shares of this latter corporation.
Offers were made through Canadian newspapers which were sold in the United States
and Canada. The SEC sought an injunction alleging violations of §17 (a) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. §77q (a) (1964) and §10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id. §78j (b). The court
found that it was sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction that fraudulent offers were
made in the United States. In dicta, the court indicated that the offers need not have
been made in the United States since jurisdiction under the fraud provisions of the
'33 and '34 Acts required only the use of the mails or facilities of interstate commerce.
Id. at 995.
50. 405 F. 2d 200, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F. 2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968>
(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
51. .d. at 206. See also Strassheim v. Daily, 2.21 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) ("Acts done
outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects
within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the actor] had been
present at the [time of the detrimental] effect, if the state should succeed in getting
him within its power.")
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Since the corporation had not come "within the jurisdiction" under the
Kook analysis by a substantial act within the territorial boundaries of
the United States, the decision rested on a narrower interpretation of
the exemption which section 30 (b) grants to those persons transacting
"a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States."
Contrary to the previous cases, the Schoenbaum decision limited the
exemption to its explicit statutory terms, stating that it applied only
where the person actually engaged in a regular "business in securities,"
that is, brokers, dealers, and banks. 52 The court noted that the SEC had
still not promulgated any regulations or rules which might bring within
the scope of the Securities Exchange Act transactions outside the United
States and currently exempted under 30 (b) .5 However, in line with its
holding that 30 (b) did not exempt defendants who maintained no
securities business, the court pointed out that the SEC also had the
authority to exempt foreign conduct ordinarily covered by rule lOb-5,
but had not done so.54
The court's discussion of whether foreign conduct was included under
rule lOb-5 assumed the requisite "effects" within the jurisdiction needed
to allow the exercise of legislative jurisdiction under international lawA5
and also the use of the facilities of interstate commerce or the mails
necessary to trigger the provisions of section 10 in the first instance.56
It has been suggested that the Schoenbaum view of the 30 (b) exemp-
tion while correct as far as it goes, should be carried a step further.57
This view agrees with the limitation of the exemption to those actually
engaged in a securities business.58 However, this should not be strictly
construed as an absolute exemption which prevents application of the
provisions of the Exchange Act to such persons without exception. It
should only protect brokers or dealers5 9 in situations in which no other
52. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds,
405 F. 2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
53. Id. at 207.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 208-209.
56. Id. at 209-210.
57. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae on rehearing, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F. 2d 200, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F. 2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
58. Id. at 20-21.
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §3 (a) (4, 15 U.S.C. §78c (a) (4) (1964):
The term 'broker' means any person engaged in the business of effecting transac-
tions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank.
Id. §3 (a) (5), 15 U.S.C. §78c(a) (4) (1964):
The term 'dealer' means any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include
a bank, or any person insofar as he buys and sells securities for his own account,
either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as part of a regular business.
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use of the mails or interstate commerce triggers the application of any
section of the Act. Thus a broker, dealer, or bank which uses the mails
in connection with a transaction which is fraudulent under rule lOb-5
could be reached because his identity as a broker, dealer, or bank while
protecting him under section 30 (b) , would not prevent the attachment of
jurisdiction under other sections of the statute.
The identity of a person as a broker-dealer in the securities industry
has generally been thought to be sufficient jurisdictional grounds upon
which to base the application of the Act.60 It is well established that a
security is an article in interstate commerce. 61 A person dealing in securi-
ties is thus engaged in interstate commerce whether or not the individual
transaction involved is actually carried out across state boundaries. Be-
cause of this, the Exchange Act provisions which rely on the com-
merce clause of the Constitution can attach solely through the iden-
tity of the person as a broker-dealer. Thus the broker-dealer identity is the
jurisdictional basis of several sections of the Exchange Act.62 However,
where a foreign broker or dealer is involved, the assumption that inter-
state commerce is involved is not so easily justified, for the transaction
may have nothing to do with United States securities markets. In such a
case, the application of the Exchange Act would be outside the scope
of the Constitution, since the commerce power of Congress could not
reasonably extend to such transactions. 63 The fact that a broker or dealer
was involved in the transaction would offer no basis for the assumption
of sufficient contacts with, or effects within, the jurisdiction to sustain
the validity of the application of the legislation under principles of legis-
lative jurisdiction. Even if the broker or dealer were registered under
section 15 (a) 64 this infirmity under international legal principles would
60. Certain provisions of the 1934 Act rely on the identity of the person involved.
Id. §7 (c), 15 U.S.C. §78g (c> (Supp. IV, 1969) (margin requirements which apply to
members, brokers or dealers who transact business on a national securities exchange) ;
id. §8 (a) - (d), 15 U.S.C. §78h (a) - (d) (1964) (restrictions on borrowing by members,
brokers and dealers) ; id. §15 U.S.C. §78o (1964> (registration of brokers and dealers) ;
id. §17, 15 U.S.C. §8q (1964) (accounts, records, reports, examination of exchanges,
members and others) ; id. §19 (a) (3), 15 U.S.C. §78s (a) (3) (1964) (member suspen-
sion and expulsion from an exchange).
61. See 15 U.S.C. §77 (b) (7) (1964). See also U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8. "The Congress
shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States .. "
62. See note 60 supra.
63. The commerce power only extends to foreign commerce if there is a substantial
effect on United States commerce. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. J. T. Eaton Co.,
234 F. 2d 633, 641-42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
64. 15 U.S.C. §78o (a) (1964) provides:
No broker or dealer (other than one whose business is exclusively interstate) shall
make use of the mails or of a means of instrumentality of interstate commerce to
effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security . . .
otherwise than on a national securities exchange, unless such broker or dealer is
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not be cured without sufficient contacts within the United States to
become bound by its courts under the "territorial principle". Moreover,
the "objective territorial principle" would clearly require that the
specific transaction have substantial effects within the jurisdiction. Final-
ly, while one can maintain that the protective principle could apply,
since private transactions are related to a protection of a national interest,
still no case has directly so held. The government's interest in maintain-
ing investor confidence in securities markets might also appear to be a
make-weight when compared to the severe disruption caused by activities
such as counterfeiting which traditionally come under the protective
principle. However, it would seem reasonable to argue that the protective
principle could be extended to civil cases, even though national inter-
ests or governmental functions would imply criminal sanctions, since pri-
vate individuals may effectuate national policy by holding the threat of
damages over misbehaving corporate executives.
The possibility of violation of both the Constitution and international
law was apparently viewed as the basis underlying the 30 (b) exemption
by the SEC. In its amicus curiae brief in Schoenbaum, the SEC stated:
The final group of operative provisions of the original version of the Act was
applicable to persons in the securities business even in the absence of a registered
security or a use of the jurisdictional means. Under these provisions the "trigger-
ing" element was the identity of the person involved in the transaction itself,
and any particular foreign transaction might or might not have a sufficient im-
pact on American interests to justify the direct application of the Act to the
transaction irrespective of the participation or nonparticipation of someone in
the securities business. In other words, although the United States might have
power over a participant in a foreign transaction the transaction itself might not
have sufficient impact on American interests and therefore not be within the
direct legislative jurisdiction of Congress under the Constitution and the Law of
Nations. It was this problem to which Section 30(b) was addressed.05
If this is the rationale behind the exemption, it would appear to be
an exemption which necessity demands. There would be no need to
extend it to protect brokers or dealers when they had used the mails or
the facilities of interstate commerce in connection with allegedly wrong-
ful transactions. Such persons could be reached in a manner consistent
with the Constitution and international law. Thus, according to the in-
terpretation by the SEC, a "person transacting a business in securities"
would only be "without the jurisdiction" under section 30 (b) when not
involved in a transaction which utilized the facilities of interstate com-
merce.66 Where use of such facilities, or a registered security, or use of
the mails were involved, such persons would not be exempt, since the
registered....
65. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae on rehearing, supra note 57 at 20-21.
66. Id. at 23-24. One commentator has suggested that the SEC's reading of "without
the jurisdiction of the United States" should be rejected. See Note, United States Taxa-
tion and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HARv. L. REV. 404, 451 (1969).
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exemption would apply only to those sections of the Act which rely
exclusively on the identity of the person as a broker or dealer as a basis
for jurisdiction.67
III CONCLUSION
The interpretation of the 30 (b) exemption made by the Schoenbaum
court follows a different rationale than that employed by the SEC. The
court construed the exemption as being premised upon a rule of con-
venience for brokers and dealers.68 Because of the difficulties involved
in registration and attempted regulation of foreign persons transacting
"business in securities," and the negligible results which could accrue,
the court intimates that the best line of conduct would be the creation of
a clear exemption of such broker-dealers from the Securities Exchange
Act.0 9 This rationale, if followed, would logically lead to the exemption of
all foreign persons transacting "business in securities" regardless of what
section of the Act was being utilized against them. Such an exemption
would seem to be what the Schoenbaum court would grant were a case
to arise under rule lOb-5 which actually involved a broker or dealer.
As it was, the court did not reach that specific issue since the suit before
it was not against a person engaged in a securities business. On the other
hand, the SEC indicated in its amicus brief that the broker or dealer
would be outside the protection of the exemption in cases in which he
had used the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce in con-
nection with the transaction complained of.7 If this SEC intrepretation
were accepted by the courts, foreign broker-dealers would rarely receive
the benefit of an exemption since it is almost inevitable that some use of
the United States mails would have been made. Though the SEC inter-
pretation may be the more logically consistent, it could create damaging
uncertainty in international securities' law for the courts might be
tempted to overextend the limits of legislative jurisdiction under inter-
national law by finding "substantial effects" within the United States
where, practically speaking, only insubstantial effects exist.
67. See note 60 supra.
68. 405 F. 2d at 207, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F. 2d 215 (2d. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). In the course of its opinion, the court stated
that the purpose of section 30 (b) is:
[T]o permit persons in the securities business to conduct transactions in securities
outside of the United States without complying with the burdensome reporting re-
quirement of the Act and without being subject to its regulatory provisions, except
insofar as the Commission finds it necessary and appropriate to regulate such trans-
actions to prevent evasion of the Act.
69. Id. at 207-208.
70. See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing at 23-24; see also text accom-
panying note 66.
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